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Law against Order: Human Rights
Organizations and (versus?) the
Palestinian Authority
LISA HAJJAR*
I. INTRODUCTION
The outbreak of relatively large-scale, open violence in Israel, the
West Bank and Gaza in October 2000 proved the fragility of the interim
arrangements. The "second uprising," or "new intifada" as it is often
called, resembles the first uprising (1987-1993) in some regards, notably
the Palestinian desperation and frustration it showcases. One crucial dif-
ference is the profoundly changed political context.1 The first uprising
came at a time of total political stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict. It revealed the untenability of Israeli occupation over all of the
West Bank and Gaza, and this was a factor that pushed Israeli and Pales-
tinian leaders to begin a process of direct negotiations in 1991. The
results of these negotiations have included the signing of a Declaration
of Principles in 1993, the beginning of a phased redeployment of Israeli
military forces, and the establishment in 1994 of a Palestinian Authority
(PA) with limited powers of "self-government" over parts of the Pales-
tinian population and territory in the West Bank and Gaza. Despite these
changes, the negotiations have failed to produce an agreement that
would end the conflict, let alone bring peace. What they produced,
instead, is an interim.
Much of the analysis that strives to explain the renewed violence
has focused on the negotiations, specifically on the gaps between what
Palestinians expected or could hope to expect, and what they have actu-
ally gotten, or, more aptly, failed to get. Since 1993 standards of living
have fallen dramatically (i.e., no "peace dividend"), Israeli land confis-
cation and Jewish settlement building have continued unabated (i.e., no
end to occupation), Palestinian statehood remains deferred (i.e., no self-
determination), refugees remain unrepatriated (i.e., no right of return),
and so on. For many commentators and informed observers, the negotia-
tions represent either the cause or solution to the current crisis, or both.
For most, notwithstanding vast differences of opinion and perspective,
* Lisa Hajjar, a sociologist, teaches in the Law and Society Program, University of
California-Santa Barbara. Send comments to lhajjar@lawso.ucsb.edu.
I. Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari, Anatomy of Another Rebellion, MIDDLE EAST REP.,
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negotiations represent the only viable political option to pursue an end to
the conflict.
The focus of this Article is not the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
but the interim itself. The central concern is the politics of law and order
in PA areas, specifically struggles over human rights and the rule of law.
I argue that the form and trajectory of these struggles are shaped largely
by the fact that Palestinians are living in a protracted interim phase. One
key factor is the nature of PA rule, which could be described as "autono-
mous authoritarianism."
Some of the harshest and most consistent criticism of PA rule has
come from Palestinian human rights organizations. The weakness of the
PA in relation to Israel and the fragility of the current situation are used
to justify official condemnation and repression of local critics, including
human rights organizations and activists. These tensions have affected
popular attitudes and debates about human rights. But other factors,
including the role of international organizations, also contribute to offi-
cial antipathy and public skepticism about the appropriateness and effi-
cacy of human rights in such a politically unstable and economically
underdeveloped society. In this regard, struggles over human rights in
Palestine resemble circumstances elsewhere in the Middle East and
other parts of the world.
II. IN-BETWEEN TIME
An "interim" is a temporal concept, describing an in-between time.
In this context, it describes the period between the "before," before the
start of negotiations, the creation of a PA, etc., and the "end," the sign-
ing of a final agreement that will transform the conflict from politics into
history. The desire and mutual need for peace will keep pulling Israeli
and Palestinian representatives back to the negotiating table, if for no
other reason than a lack of viable alternatives. National elites on both
sides, and the constituencies with whom they are aligned, have become
politically dependent on the process of peace-making.
But the irreconcilability of Israeli and Palestinian national claims
and interests holds the end in abeyance, stretching present time into an
interminable in-between phase. For Israelis, the interim is significant but
relatively less decisive to their collective well-being since they already
have a sovereign state and a robust economy. For Palestinians, the
interim represents a major transition-from statelessness to proto-state-
hood. The PA is an "interim government," not a sovereign state. It lacks
independence, control over borders, natural resources, trade, immigra-
tion, and other trappings of sovereignty. It also lacks control over
"national time." For example, in May 1999, Palestinians were poised to
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exercise their national will by declaring an independent state. The date
was not arbitrary; it had been set years before as the scheduled end to the
interim. But powerful others convinced or pressured the PA to wait, or
rather, to keep waiting for a better, more appropriate time. For the Pales-
tinian people, "in the interim" has become a way of life.
What is living in the interim like for Palestinians? Of course, we
must be cautious about over generalizing. For some well-connected indi-
viduals, the interim is a boom-time. The Palestinian economy in the
"self-governing" areas is the most privatized of any in the entire Middle
East.' The combination of limited political autonomy, persisting state-
lessness and poorly-or corruptly-regulated investments and business
monopolies has created narrow but deep opportunities for profiteering.
For most, though, the interim is a desperate time. Those who remain
cautiously optimistic about the prospects for peace cling to the hope that
this interim is merely a period of delayed gratification, that ultimately
there will be a reward for struggle and steadfastness. The question is
whether the interim can be conceived as a period and process of "state-
building." Palestinian critics of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations see
the cause of national independence as so badly compromised that "Pal-
estine" will become, or has become, not a state-in-the-making but a col-
lection of bantustans, confining some and excluding others.' Skeptics
concede that Palestine might become a state someday, but a bad one.
They predict Palestine will be another "Arab dictatorship" bearing no
resemblance to the dream of democratic self-determination that
animated the decades of national struggle. For Palestinians in the dias-
pora, especially those still living as refugees in surrounding Arab states,
the interim serves, paradoxically, as a nominally hopeful interlude, stav-
ing off a miserable, exclusionary, dream-killing end to a collective,
trans-continental Palestinian time.
For Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, the prospect of state-
hood seems more tangible. Since 1994, some of the trappings of a state
have been instituted: ministries have been formed and staffed, jurisdic-
tions have been drawn, and a legislative council has been elected. In
circulation are discourses of state-making and statehood: territorial con-
trol, economic development, national security, separation of powers, and
the rule of law. In this interim, and because it is an interim, there is a
heightened consciousness about the opportunities transition affords.
Some are taking advantage of the unsettledness to compete for power.
2. William A. Orme, Jr., For Palestinians, 0 Little Town of Business Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 2000, at A4.
3. See GRAHAM USHER, PALESTINE IN CRISIS: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE AFTER OSLO (2d ed. 1997).
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Others are seeking to thwart final outcomes that contravene the princi-
ples of democracy and the rule of law.
Among those who are trying to use the interim to "do good" are
Palestinian human rights organizations (HROs) in the West Bank and
Gaza. The politics and discourse of human rights in these areas devel-
oped under and in response to Israeli military occupation.4 Since 1994,
their focus has shifted-or broadened-to include corruption, violations,
and derogations of the rule of law by the PA. HROs legitimize their
criticisms of the PA as a continuation of their role as champions and
defenders of Palestinians' rights. They have reformulated their agendas
and strategies to monitor the exercise of PA power and to advocate the
establishment of mechanisms and popular expectations for governmental
accountability. HROs see the interim as crucial to entrenching a culture
of rights and the rule of law. The PA, finding itself having to contend
with critics and criticisms from "within" (the national community), has
attempted to delegitimize HROs as disrupting or undermining "national
unity" during this "fragile time."
Hence, what has emerged are competing discourses, each claiming
to represent the "national good." Human rights discourse holds forth a
vision of the future that is as attentive to individuals as it is to the collec-
tive. Human rights discourse prioritizes democratic pluralism, equality,
and the rule of law as both means and goals of state-building. In con-
trast, the discourse of the PA prioritizes unity, loyalty and order. For the
PA now, as for its precursor, the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), the interests of the Palestinian people are conceived in collective
terms and managed through centralized political structures.
The transition of the Palestinian leadership, from a resistance
movement under the umbrella of the PLO, whose center of operation
was the diaspora (Jordan until 1970, Lebanon until 1983, and Tunisia
until 1994), to a "self-governing" authority geographically concentrated
in portions of the occupied territories, has been fraught with problems.
The PA has utilized means to establish its rule and to maintain order that
give it an uncanny resemblance to the Israeli military administration that
it has partially replaced. For example, the use of security laws, military
courts, brutal interrogation tactics, and censorship of oppositional speech
are elements of continuity from an Israeli-controlled past to a PA-con-
trolled present. HROs criticize such practices, both as violations of
human rights and as inimical to national interests, while the PA justifies
4. Lisa Hajjar, From the Fight for Legal Rights to the Promotion of Human Rights: Israeli
and Palestinian Cause Lawyers in the Trenches of Globalization, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE
STATE IN THE GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001).
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them as necessary and therefore legitimate to protect the gains of
national power in the homeland.
In the interim, PA rule has assumed a highly authoritarian form,
with governing power concentrated in the hands of a coterie of PLO-
cum-PA leaders and especially in the person of "President" Yasir Arafat.
But this power is autonomous, not sovereign, and any ability to maintain
it is contingent on the PA's ability and willingness to keep "the people"
under control in accordance with Israeli expectations. Given popular dis-
satisfaction with the present arrangements, which are exacerbated by
high unemployment, gross abuses of police power and rampant official
corruption, the PA enforces the national unity it claims to represent
through a combination of patronage and repression.
III. PALESTINIAN POLITICS IN THE INTERIM
One might reasonably imagine that repression, corruption and
authoritarianism would generate broad support among the Palestinian
public for human rights and the organizations that represent that cause.
Popular acceptance of the need for unity, however, and the symbolic
legitimacy of Arafat's leadership have remained relatively strong, albeit
subject to fluctuation. Moreover, present conditions have produced a
powerful dependency on the PA for survival; fully one-fifth of employed
Palestinians work in the public sector, and job security is made directly
contingent on support for the regime. Of the employed, a relatively large
number (estimated at 40,000) work in the fourteen security services
operating in the "self-governing" areas, illuminating both patronage and
a will to repress.'
Because of the fragility of the interim, even before the second
intifada, there has been little or no official tolerance for criticism. Even
some within the Palestinian human rights community are persuaded that
this is not the time to criticize the PA because it could weaken the Pales-
tinian position in the negotiations and undermine future territorial gains
and prospects for statehood. The PA has capitalized on such ambiva-
lence by periodically singling out its critics in the human rights commu-
nity for public shaming, accusing them of impeding the state-building
process and serving foreign (read: Israeli and American) interests.
Alone, HROs lack the political status or popular base to counter or
rival the PA. One factor that works to their advantage, however, is the
importance and influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
Palestine. HROs are part of a larger constellation of NGOs that enjoy a
5. USHER, supra note 3.
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great deal of legitimacy as home-grown and historically active on behalf
of the needs and interests of society.
Over the decades of Israeli occupation, NGOs performed many of
the duties and provided services that would, under "normal" conditions,
have been undertaken by a state: education, medical care, agricultural
development, vocational training, small-business support, data gather-
ing, survey research, and so on. Many NGOs began as specialized
branches of the various PLO factions, functioning as part of a mass
movement and contributing to the national struggle. Because Israel out-
lawed nationalist organizations and activism, NGOs assumed increas-
ingly important public roles and, in some cases, greater autonomy from
the PLO factions from which they had originated.
During the first uprising, when the Palestinian population was
engaged in mass resistance against Israeli occupation, the situation in the
territories deteriorated into then unprecedented levels of violence and
repression. Under these conditions of heightened emergency, Palestinian
NGOs expanded their service roles and activities. Such expansion pro-
pelled an increasing reliance on foreign donors for operating funds. This
dependence increased after the Gulf War in 1991, when funding from
the PLO and other Arab governments to the West Bank and Gaza shriv-
eled. NGOs' eligibility for funding from foreign governments and foun-
dations often required them to adopt a more "professional," less overtly
political-national approach to their practices. This shift from mass-based
movements to professional organizations weakened the connections
between NGOs and their "grass-roots" constituencies.6 Nevertheless,
NGOs retained local legitimacy as the backbone of "civil society"
because they continued to provide crucial services and to articulate clear
civic and social agendas. They also continued to provide an important
source of employment, especially for middle class and educated Pales-
tinians seeking to pursue careers that align with their skills and
commitments.
When the PLO leaders came to the West Bank and Gaza from
abroad (Tunis) in 1994, they saw the power and influence of these
NGOs as something to be incorporated-or subordinated-to the PA.
As Hammami, Hilal and Tamari explain, tensions between the PA and
NGOs have arisen out of struggles to define and establish "internal
6. See George Giacaman, Popular Movements and Democratic Transformation, 16 NEws
FROM WITHIN 3 (2000); Rema Hammami, NGOs: The Professionalisation of Politics, 37 RACE
AND CLASS 51 (1995); Majed Nassar, Palestinian NGOs: Prospects in the Post-Oslo Era, 14
NEWs FROM WITHIN 10 (1998); Ahmed Nimer, From Mobilizers to Service Providers: NGOs and
the Left in Palestine, 13 NEWs FROM WITHIN 11 (1997).
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boundaries" between "state" and "civil society" in the interim period.7
According to George Giacaman, the "PLO model," developed in the
diaspora, was one of "exaggerated centralism," involving a blurring of
society and civil institutions into the framework of a quasi-state.8 The
PA instituted this model in the West Bank and Gaza, producing a politi-
cal system that could be described as a mosaic of axes all vertically
incorporated (through clientelism) or otherwise dominated by the center,
in which decision-making power is monopolized by Arafat and political
elites with close ties to him. This top-down centralism contradicted the
political culture that emerged in the territories during the decades of
occupation, in which political power was decentralized and decision-
making about issues of national importance tended to be far more
democratic.
PA efforts to establish a monopoly on power and influence in the
territories included targeting NGOs on the grounds that their operational
autonomy was no longer necessary or beneficial now that a central gov-
ernment exists. The PA was also motivated by a desire to commandeer
all foreign aid coming to Palestine, thereby hoping to turn some NGOs
into PA clients and to starve others to death, notably HROs. In 1995, the
PA moved to rein in this sector. The timing was linked to a World Bank
initiative to establish a fifteen million dollar Palestinian NGO trust fund.
Among the tactics used by the PA was the introduction of legislation
modeled on a highly restrictive Egyptian NGO law, which includes the
stipulation that the Ministry of Interior must approve all foreign fund-
ing.9 The Palestinian NGO network (PNGO) mobilized to prevent this
outcome by drafting a more liberal law and successfully lobbying for the
support of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and foreign donors.
The confrontation continued when Arafat refused to sign the law, insist-
ing that the regulating authority should be the Ministry of Interior, 10
rather than the Ministry of Justice, which PNGO was demanding. The
outcome was a compromise: the Ministry of Interior would be the
responsible authority, but the law was the liberal version passed by the
PLC, which Arafat finally signed in January 2000. One of the conse-
quences resulting from the PA's efforts to undercut the collective power
and influence of NGOs was the cultivation of a distinction between
"good" ones (charitable institutions and service providers) and "bad"
7. See generally Rema Hammami, Jamil Hilal, & Salim Tamari, Civil Society and
Governance in Palestine (1999) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
8. See Giacaman, supra note 6.
9. Julia Pinter, NGOs' Dilemmas, MIDDLE EAST REP., Spring 2000, at 34-37.
10. The Ministry of Interior houses the security services and is regarded as the most
repressive and invasive branch of the government.
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ones (primarily HROs).' I
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS ARE "WESTERN"
PA enmity toward HROs is only one factor, albeit an important
one, in explaining the difficulties of promoting human rights in Pales-
tine. Another is the belief that human rights are "Western." A deep
sense of having been wronged by "the West" in general, and the United
States in particular, is one of the most powerful tropes in Palestinian
national discourse. Since many Palestinians, and other Arabs, are
inclined to see the framework of human rights as a Western import, their
credibility is diminished. 2 This crisis of credibility is further com-
pounded by the double standard that many Western governments apply
in their uses of human rights rhetoric and related practices, often to the
detriment of people in the Middle East. For Palestinians, the most glar-
ing and grating example is the haste and fury of a United States-led
intervention to drive Iraq out of occupied Kuwait, followed by the impo-
sition and perpetuation of sanctions that have devastated Iraqi society,
while the decades-long Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, the
Golan Heights and southern Lebanon mobilized no military reprisals or
economic sanctions from the same governments.
The notion that human rights norms are "Western" is easily demon-
strated by those inclined to make or accept this argument. Historically,
international human rights were established at a time when much of the
world, including Palestine, was still under European colonial rule. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed in 1948, the same
year Palestinians suffered their greatest disaster (al-naqba). In subse-
quent decades, Palestinians, as a stateless people, have had little oppor-
tunity to participate in the state-centered processes of human rights norm
setting, treaty drafting, enforcement, and so on. Moreover, the core
human rights principles of "universalism," "equality" and "self-determi-
nation" have stood in direct and utter contradiction to most Palestinians'
lived realities, and thus ring hollow on the popular level. This has been
compounded by a failure on the part of the international community to
enforce international laws to protect or promote Palestinians' rights,
including the right of refugees to return to their homeland, or to prevent
Israeli violations, including torture, deportations, collective punishment,
confiscation of land, and the settlement of its own citizens in territories
II. Rema Hammami, Jamil Hilal & Salim Tamari, Civil Society in Palestine: Case Studies
(1999) (unpublished paper) (on file with author); Rema Hammami, Palestinian NGOs Since Oslo:
From NGO Politics to Social Movements?, MIDDLE EAST REP., Spring 2000, at 16-19, 27, 48.
12. Bahey El Din Hassan, Credibility Crisis of International Human Rights in the Arab
World, 2 HUM. RTS. DIALOGUE 1, 9-10 (2000).
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occupied in war. "
The "Western-ness" of human rights and their irrelevance to non-
Western societies is a contestable claim, as demonstrated by the devel-
opment of active human rights movements throughout the Third World.
In the West Bank and Gaza, human rights activism became linked and
complimentary to other forms of struggle for self-determination. During
the occupation, Palestinian human rights activists and organizations
attracted broad popular support for their capacity to direct international
attention and criticism to violations by the Israeli state, especially during
the first uprising.
With regard to the current situation, it is crucial to understand that
the PLO leadership in the diaspora never bought into or adapted itself to
a human rights framework. Lip service was paid if HROs in the West
Bank and Gaza could serve a national-political purpose of condemning
or restraining Israel. But HROs were later regarded as hostile and dan-
gerous once the PA was established and the standards were applied to
restrain and judge them. The PA's primary tactic to discredit HROs has
been to promote the idea that they and their standards are "foreign." This
critique resonates with many Palestinians because of an enduring per-
ception that human rights remain an instrument of Western govern-
ments, often invoked in ways that discriminate against Arabs and
Muslims.
Skepticism about human rights among Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza cannot be dismissed merely as an example of national
politics trumping law, or nostalgia for the revolutionary "anti-imperial-
ist" stance of a bygone era. Rather, it reflects a critical assessment of
what the politics and practices of human rights have become. It is a
question of who "controls" human rights. All of the major international
organizations are based or headquartered in Europe or the U.S., and their
operating style, activities and agendas tend to reflect professional norms
and politico-legal priorities of those societies. Hence, many outside the
West see international human rights organizations as, at best, distant,
often out of touch with local realities or insensitive to local sensibilities,
or, at worst, mechanisms functioning to fortify Western global
hegemony."
In Palestine, as elsewhere, for local human rights organizations to
gain the attention and support of international human rights organiza-
13. JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE (1990); HUMAN
RIGHTS, SELF-DETERMINATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORIES (Stephen Bowen ed., 1997); Richard Falk, International Law and the al-Aqsa
Intifada, MIDDLE EAST REP., Winter 2000, at 16-18.
14. See HUMAN RIGHTS Fi'ry YEARS ON: A REAPPRAISAL (Tony Evans ed., 1998).
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tions, they have had to-or chosen to-emulate the same models and
strategies. This means prioritizing political and civil rights over, or to
the exclusion of, social and economic rights; functioning as watchdogs
chasing discrete and verifiable violations; producing reports and state-
ments in a common human rights vernacular that is de-politicized and
legalistic; and seeing and promoting themselves as "neutral" and "objec-
tive." Following this model has become increasingly crucial to obtaining
foreign funding, and obtaining foreign funding has, in turn, become cru-
cial to following this model. The funding that supports Palestinian
HROs comes almost exclusively from the West-from Western govern-
ments and foundations, and Western-based and controlled organizations
such as the World Bank.
HROs not only depend on Western funding, they also depend on-
and work to gain the attention of-Western audiences. In other words,
Western actors (governments, media, organizations) have become the
primary constituencies for local human rights activism. According to
Abdullahi An-Na'im:
Human rights "dependency" is the idea of generating pressure in the
North to persuade governments in the South to protect the rights of
their people .... [This] is not how human rights are protected in the
North itself .... But human rights dependency works and is seen as
legitimate because this approach does have some immediate impact
on the countries of the South. [Arab governments are] more respon-
sive to pressures from Western governments than from their own
people .... But the problem is that this approach disregards the point
that human rights dependency is possible because of other dependen-
cies .... Human rights dependency legitimizes other dependencies
and perpetuates dependent relationships.15
The dependency of HROs on Western support and attention is by
no means particular to Palestine. But because the PA is so dependent on
foreign support for its budget and, indeed, its survival, it is extremely
and profoundly vulnerable to international opinion. Thus, unlike other
governments with weak human rights records which have the "luxury"
of greater self-sufficiency to ignore international criticisms, or at least
have the status as sovereign states to defend themselves in international
fora, the impact of human rights critiques on the PA could be devastat-
ing. Luckily for the PA, the two most powerful foreign actors, the U.S.
and Israeli governments, are less concerned about, if not flatly indiffer-
15. Middle East Research & Information Project, Problems of Dependency: Human Rights
Organizations in the Arab World: An Interview with Abdullahi An-Na'im, MIDDLE EAST REP.,
Spring 2000, at 20-23, 46-47. (transcript of an interview conducted by Lisa Hajjar on Jan. 7,
2000).
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ent to, violations of Palestinians' rights and the rule of law as long as the
PA remains committed to "fighting terrorism."
V. DEPENDENCY AND AUTONOMY
PA dependency affects its legitimacy among its own constituency.
The PA is a creation of the negotiations; its geographically and politi-
cally limited powers, and institutional subordination to Israeli hegemony
(e.g., Israel has veto power over new legislation) are reminders of the
weakness of the Palestinian position. The main leverage Palestinians
have is a threat to "return to the streets" should they fail to achieve
independent statehood and other national demands (notably Jerusalem as
the capital and the refugees' right of return). This leverage has been
amply demonstrated by the second uprising. But the renewal of wide
scale unrest also demonstrates the political weakness and vulnerability
of the PA since its fate and survival are contingent on its capacity to
maintain order.
Throughout the interim, order has served as the marker of Palestini-
ans' "good faith" and commitment to peace, even if it had to be imposed
in brutal fashion. The PA's use of repression to disable opposition and
thwart unrest has been disparaged by discontented sectors of the popula-
tion as a buckling under to Israeli demands and U.S. pressure. In other
words, the PA is vulnerable to domestic criticisms that it has become a
tool of Western power and interests. Hence, silencing critics has been
crucial to obscuring the PA's own dependency and political failings.
Critiques of the PA come from many quarters, including the
Islamist movement and leftist opposition parties. But HROs' critiques
have been particularly damning because they have focused international
attention on the PA's anti-democratic, repressive and often violent
modes of rule. To the extent that some repression, especially against
Islamists, clearly has been undertaken at the behest of Israel raises seri-
ous questions about where the PA's accountability lies. At the same
time, the PA's rejoinder to criticisms of official repression and corrup-
tion is that HROs are pandering to foreign powers and serving the inter-
ests (whether purposefully or not) of "the enemy." Accusations of
serving "foreign interests" and lack of local accountability have become
a double-edged sword, wielded to cut into the legitimacy of both HROs
and the PA, highlighting the dependency of both on foreign support and
funding.
The divisive implications of dependency were dramatically illus-
trated in a highly public confrontation that developed between the PA
and HROs in 1999. It began when the Office of the United Nations Spe-
cial Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO) issued a report,
2001]
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"Rule of Law Development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Survey of
the Development Effort," that detailed foreign donor support for the rule
of law sector in the Palestinian self-governing areas. 16 Because of the
report's focus on legal and human rights capacity-building, it highlights
and commends the contributions of NGOs, noting that they "act as the
voice of civil society and are the heart of democratic discourse."'' 7
According to the report, of the more than one hundred million dollars
contributed to develop the Palestinian rule of law sector, approximately
twenty million dollars has gone to NGOs with human rights, legal and
civic mandates.' 8
The report was seized upon by some officials in the PA to
denounce NGOs as "a bunch of thieves, fat cats and foreign agents."' 9
Freih Abu Middein, the Minister of Justice, in an interview on the PA's
Voice of Palestine, "accused human rights organizations of being
stooges of foreign backers and claimed their directors received salaries
of more than $10,000, equivalent to the salaries of ten judges."'
This confrontation spiraled into an open debate throughout Pales-
tinian society. For example, six political factions issued a joint public
statement not only denouncing the PA's smear campaign and defending
NGOs' nationalist credentials, but also calling for greater NGO financial
transparency and more accountability to Palestinian society rather than
foreign donors. Rema Hammami writes:
The running and heated debate in the press throughout June and July
[1999] pitted the sorry state of the PA legal system against alleged
financial excesses of the NGOs as a whole and accusations of "col-
laboration" and disloyalty by human rights groups in particular. The
public was not likely to be sympathetic to the PA given the impact of
the dysfunctional legal system and overt corruption that has marked
PA governance. However, given the dramatic drops in standards of
16. The UNSCO report details the institutional organization and funding allocations to the
rule of law sector, which is divided into fifteen separate areas. The total amount committed to this
sector is US $100,752,612. The fifteen areas and percentage of funding each received are:
Ministry of Justice Capacity-building (2.2%); Judicial System (14%); Prosecutorial System
(0.03%); Legal Practice (5.1%); Law Enforcement (14.4%); Penal Institution (0.5%); National
Policy for Human Rights/Rule of Law (4.9%); NGOs (16.7%); Palestinian Independent
Commission for Citizens' Rights (1.7%); Legislative Council Capacity-building (15%); Law
Reform (4.4%); Forensic Science Capacity-building (1.5%); Electoral System (10.2%); Conflict
Resolution Capacity-building (1.4%); Human Rights and Public Information (7.5%). OFFICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COORDINATOR IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, RULE OF LAW
DEVELOPMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP: SURVEY AND STATE OF THE DEVELOPMENT
EFFORT 49-50 (May 1999), available at http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/programs/polisci/faculty/rexb/
unsco-ruleoflaw/.
17. Id. at 31.
18. Id. at 33-40.
19. Hammami, supra note 11, at 18.
20. Id. at 19.
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living for much of the population, post-Oslo, there was some popular
sympathy with the accusation that NGOs were living too well off the
donor "gravy train."
2
'
The crisis sparked by the UNSCO report tapped a deep vein of
discontent and anxieties about governance during the interim. The Pales-
tinian Legislative Council's increasing reliance on support by NGOs to
leverage its own struggle for power vis-A-vis the PA executive branch
inspired some members to speak out in defense of HROs. This support
derives from a shared interest in entrenching a separation of powers and
legislative autonomy (which Arafat frequently violates through a refusal
to sign passed laws into force). But others in the PLC with closer ties to
the PA executive have distanced themselves or openly joined in criticiz-
ing the NGOs.
In November 1999, another crisis developed when twenty promi-
nent Palestinians, including nine PLC members, signed a petition titled
"A Cry from the Homeland," protesting PA corruption, abuse of power,
and abandonment of national goals (notably the rights of refugees). The
PA regarded the petition as "political incitement," and responded
harshly, arresting nine signatories and putting two more under house
arrest. Under pressure from the PA executive, a special session of the
PLC was called, and, in a close vote, the nine members who had signed
the petition were condemned for causing "internal conflict."22 HROs
(and other NGOs) condemned the arrests and attacks on petitioners as
inimical to freedom of speech and democratization. But public disagree-
ments over the legitimacy and utility of such a petition stoked divisions
within society over whether the preservation of national unity justified
draconian tactics against critics and opponents of the government.
The position of the legal sector in confrontations between the PA
and HROs has reflected these divisions. Some legal professionals
appreciate the role that HROs have played in bringing problems they
face in their own work to the public's attention. These problems include
egregious disregard for the authority and autonomy of the judiciary,
exemplified by repeated refusals on the part of the PA or security forces
to execute judicial decisions. They also include the trampling of the rule
of law and lawyers' rights to represent clients in fair and open proce-
dures in the PA's shadowy "security courts." On the other hand, the
legal sector is highly vulnerable to an authoritarian PA, and many legal
professionals have become dependent on the PA for their livelihood,
21. Id. at 19.
22. One PLC member, who was called in for questioning by the security services, was badly
beaten, although officials denied responsibility, saying the wounds were self-inflicted in further
effort on his part to discredit the PA. Another signatory was shot and wounded outside his home
by masked men widely assumed to be security agents.
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thereby impeding or stifling their willingness to support or side with
critics.
In May 2000, the confrontation between the PA and HROs shifted
directly onto the terrain of the legal profession. The PA launched a new
campaign to neutralize and inhibit HROs by seeking to force the Pales-
tinian Bar Association to exclude NGO employees from membership on
the grounds that they are "non-practicing lawyers." Since many HROs
are run and staffed by lawyers, if successful, this could force them out of
their own professional association. The rhetoric circulating around this
crisis over human rights lawyers' membership in the Bar is a continua-
tion of debates over whether HROs function as "foreign agents" with
political agendas that damage national interests, or as defenders of
Palestinians' rights against a repressive and largely unaccountable
government.23
In March 2001, the confrontation took a new turn when the Pales-
tinian High Court issued a decision to postpone elections for the Bar
Association. Although the decision relates the postponement to the cur-
rent crisis with Israel, people in the human rights community suspect
that the PA pushed the court to take this stance to prevent the Bar from
playing a more active role in monitoring the government.
VI. BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW
Given the PA's open animosity to critics and its ability to monopo-
lize the discourse of "national unity," HROs have been challenged in
their ability to contribute to the entrenchment of a culture of rights and
the rule of law. Moreover, the problems facing Palestinian society are so
vast and serious that HROs are incapable of effectively monitoring or
otherwise intervening in all areas warranting their attention. Although
HROs have made efforts to address social and economic rights, for
example supporting teachers striking for higher salaries, or protesting
industrial pollution and mismanagement, for the most part they have
limited their work to violations of political and civil rights. Such selec-
tivity has made them vulnerable to criticisms that they are merely mim-
icking their Western counterparts, or that they are forfeiting a chance to
build a stronger popular base by not prioritizing the most pressing needs
and concerns of the majority (i.e., poverty, unemployment and limited
social services).
In order to appreciate the challenges to building the rule of law in
the interim, it is necessary to contextualize this project in the broader
23. See Special Section on Crisis in the Palestinian Bar Association, 40 PEOPLE'S RTS. 26
(2000).
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history of Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza. During the
occupation, the population was united in its opposition to Israeli rule and
every Israeli violation could be seen as part of a larger assault on soci-
ety. Hence, the discourse on the rule of law was deployed as a form of
protest. But Palestinians outside of the human rights and legal commu-
nity had little understanding of law except for the draconian and punitive
features of the Israeli military legal system. Although human rights criti-
ques of Israeli violations were framed in legal terms and referenced
international laws, they could be interpreted on the popular level as serv-
ing a national-political rather than legal purpose.
Alienation from law was heightened during the first uprising. For
example, one of the strategies of resistance was to boycott Palestinian
courts on the grounds that they functioned as puppets or proxies of the
Israeli military administration. The alternatives that people developed
for resolving inter-Palestinian conflicts were either "un-legal," such as
community arbitration, or "anti-legal," such as vigilantism. By the end
of the 1980s, as the situation in the West Bank and Gaza deteriorated
into internecine strife, people became increasingly reliant on "factional
justice," which contributed to an atmosphere of anti-legalism. To the
extent that HROs began protesting Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence
and human rights violations even before the Israeli-Palestinian negotia-
tions began in 1991, they were articulating an "objectivity" that lacked
wide popular appeal because it cut against the grain of factional loyal-
ties. The atmosphere of anti-legalism was compounded when the PA
came to power. The underdeveloped legal system and panoply of out-
dated and conflicting legal codes in force in the West Bank and Gaza
merely facilitated PA authoritarianism and disregard for the rule of
law.24
The difficulties and dilemmas in building the rule of law and pro-
moting a culture of rights in Palestine can be examined through the issue
of the death penalty. This issue brings together an array of concerns that
HROs have been striving to address: (1) lack of due process protections,
an independent judiciary, and a clear set of laws; (2) unfair trial proce-
dures which are particularly pronounced in the security courts; (3) the
use of torture; (4) the impunity and unprofessionalism of the security
24. The various legal codes in force in the West Bank and Gaza include laws dating from the
Ottoman period and the British Mandate over Palestine, as well as Jordanian laws (West Bank)
and Egyptian laws (Gaza) dating from the period between 1948 and 1967. Another set are Israeli
military orders, imposed during the decades of occupation, although their status in PA areas in the
interim is unclear and contested. See JONATHAN KUTrAB AND RAJA SHEHADEH, THE WEST BANK
AND THE RULE OF LAW (1980); RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK
(1988); INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (Emma
Playfair ed., 1992).
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services; and (5) excessive reliance on violence to resolve problems and
conflicts.
For all its gross violations of Palestinians' rights, the Israeli mili-
tary administration rarely sentenced people to death and never carried
out a court-ordered execution even though it did use extra-legal execu-
tions by security forces. Therefore, the PA's introduction of the death
penalty was a significant departure from the previous regime. Many
HROs have taken a firm stance against the death penalty as a violation
of human rights, and deride the way it has been adopted and used. The
law used by the PA to pass death sentences is based on the PLO's Revo-
lutionary Law of 1979. Critics point out that there is no legal basis to
"import" such a law from Lebanon to the West Bank and Gaza, espe-
cially since its imposition by the PA executive has circumvented the
legislative process. The rampant abuses and problems in the security
courts, where almost all capital trials have been conducted, cast serious
doubt on the availability of legal justice for defendants. However, the
PA, like other regimes that rely on the death penalty, has justified this
punishment as "necessary" to fight crime and "legitimate" because the
people demand it.
Since coming to power, the PA has executed five people and sen-
tenced an additional thirty-one to death. Of this total, twenty-eight are
members of the security services. In a bizarre manner, the PA has sought
to redress popular discontentment with the enormous size and malfea-
sance of the security services by subjecting some of them to the ultimate
punishment. Executing security agents enables the PA to rationalize that
they are "not above the law." However, what it actually illuminates is a
rampant lawlessness, in which the PA is implicated.
The lack of coordination and oversight of the security services and
poor training of its employees have fostered a dangerous and violent
environment in areas under PA control. Some security agents have uti-
lized their power and weaponry to conduct both public and private
affairs with impunity. Two of the five executions conducted to date
involved brothers, both security agents, who murdered two other broth-
ers, also security agents, in the heat of a family squabble. The family and
the security agency of the victims demanded retribution. Satisfying this
demand, the PA became the executor of a "blood feud," ostensibly to
avert further inter-family violence but also to satisfy public anger at
security agents run amok. The two perpetrators were tried and executed
within three days of the crime. The third execution involved another
security agent accused of raping a six-year-old boy. The nature of the
crime provoked intense public outrage and popular demand for the death
penalty. In this case, the perpetrator was not executed for the crime of
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rape, but rather for "inciting violence against the PA," namely the public
unrest that the crime provoked. According to the Director of Preventive
Security in Gaza, the security agent/rapist "brought down the reputation
of all the security services. We had to protect our reputation. '25 As Nina
Sovich notes, "By adding executions to [the PA's system of political
control], Arafat has created another prize over which his constituents
can compete. Authority-sponsored execution is now a benchmark for the
credibility and reputation of each security service, family and political
party."26
Between 1999 and 2001, there was a de facto hiatus on executions.
In January 2001, however, executions resumed when two people were
killed after being convicted of collaborating with Israel. The executions,
which took place in Gaza and Nablus, were public spectacles attended
by thousands. Given the violence Israel has been using against Palestini-
ans since October 2000, anger against collaborators was fierce. In Febru-
ary 2001, two more were sentenced to death. One is an eighteen-year-
old whose family describes him as simple minded, and the other a secur-
ity agent convicted of providing information to the Israeli military and
deliberately opening fire in Hebron from a PA area which provoked a
brutal Israel retaliation.
While HRO opposition to the death penalty may find wider popular
support, it is difficult to gauge public opinion on the principle when the
practice has been utilized as a means of reining in security forces so
prone to abuse and excess, and striking at Israel by killing collaborators.
Indeed, HROs have found it difficult to articulate this opposition in a
way that resonates with the public, given the authoritarian nature of PA
rule and gross Israeli violations during this interim period. The lawless-
ness and resort to violence that characterize life in the West Bank and
Gaza are not solely the fault of the PA; they are consequences of a
longer history of disenfranchisement, misrule, and illegality.
In the decades of Israeli occupation, the law was utilized to dispos-
sess and disempower rather than protect Palestinians. This fostered a
skepticism about law's positive possibilities. The history of the PLO in
diaspora, in which armed struggle and factional loyalty were valorized,
bred little use or familiarity with law. This has been reflected in the
governing style of the PA. Moreover, as long as statehood is deferred, it
remains difficult to hold the PA accountable to the international legal
standards of a state, or to cultivate popular expectations or support for
legal mechanisms and remedies.
25. Nina Sovich, The Death Penalty Under the PA, 15 NEWS FROM WrrHIN 4 (1999).
26. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Those who have been working to defend Palestinians' rights and
build the rule of law during this interim period have found themselves in
the unenviable position as critics of the first Palestinian government.
The form that this government has assumed, and the practices in which
it routinely engages are a far cry from the dreams Palestinians once
shared about their future. While HROs have made PA authoritarianism
and disregard for the rule of law a focus of their criticism, their suc-
cesses have been mixed. The institutions whose support for human
rights and the rule of law is crucial-the media, courts, political parties,
PLC, Bar Association-are all vulnerable to PA repression or interven-
tion. The PA's own vulnerability and lack of sovereignty exacerbates the
perceived need and tendency to silence critics and repress political oppo-
nents. And the population's dependency on the PA as the main arbiter of
social goods and economic resources undercuts or divides opposition.
Consequently, HROs' capacity to galvanize strong and consistent public
support for human rights has been severely impeded.
The second uprising has provided a modus vivendi for the PA and
Palestinian HROs. The costs and dangers to Palestinians of Israeli vio-
lence, including the use of a pantheon of military hardware such as heli-
copter gunships, bombs and tanks, has resurrected, at least temporarily,
an earlier role that HROs played of monitoring and reporting on Israeli
violations of Palestinians' human rights. The PA and HROs have been
united in their condemnation of Israel's "excessive use of force" and
their calls for an impartial (i.e., not U.S.) international commission to
investigate the causes of the current crisis. But when this crisis abates, as
it will, the tensions that characterized PA-HRO relations will, presuma-
bly, resume, as will struggles over human rights and the rule of law in
Palestine.
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